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INTRANSITIVE
 
AGGREGATED
 
PREFERENCES
Ton Storcken1
June 1996
ABSTRACT
An impossibility theorem for preference aggretating rules is discussed. In this theorem
no transitivity condition or acyclicity condition is imposed on the preferences: neither on
the individual level nor on the aggregated level. Under the conditions that aggregation
is non-dictatorial, Pareto-optimal, neutral and independent of irrelevant alternatives, it
follows that the aggregated preferences are much more complex and therefore less
ordered than the individual preferences.
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§ 1. AGGREGATED PREFERENCES
In Social Choice Theory the aggregated preferences of a society are often imposed by
transitivity and/or acyclicity conditions. See e.g. Arrow [1963], Blair & Pollack [1979],
Blau [1957], Ferejohn & Grether [1974], and many others. On the other hand Condorcet
[1785] and Dodgson [1876], (see Black [1987]) studied aggregated preferences in
which cycles may occur.
Since Arrow's impossibility theorem which implies that dictatorial rules are the only
preference aggregation rules that are Pareto-optimal and independent of irrelevant
alternatives, many variations of this theorem have been found. A great deal of these
variations involve different transitivity conditions, hence different types of preference
orderings. Therefore, this paper focusses on whether it is possible to get rid of these
strongly negative results by dropping all transitivity and acyclicity conditions. Of course
the aggregated preferences should express a kind of ordering, therefore it is imposed
that the range of these mechanisms satisfies some ordering conditions. So, to answer
this problem it is necessary to reconsider the range of aggregation mechanism. This
range is often supposed to be the set of linear orderings, the set of weak orderings, the
set of quasi-orderings, the set of semi-orderings, the set of interval orderings or the set
of acyclic orderings (relations). In the description of these orderings the transitivity
conditions are of vital importance and if these transitivity conditions are dropped, then
of course the question arises which criteria to determine on ordering should be used.
Any transitivity condition is too demanding. It excludes e.g., tournaments relations which
have considered to be aggregated preferences. Furthermore, which transitivity
conditions should be used and why?
In Swart & Storcken [1992] the reader may find a fundamental treatment of the
phenomenon ordering which is exploited here. As in their paper here also a set of
relations which satisfies six specific conditions is said to be a set of orderings. These
six conditions are:
! QRQWULYLDOLW\ meaning that the set of relation is neither empty nor contains all
possible relations,
! FORVHGQHVVXQGHUSHUPXWDWLRQ meaning that renaming alternatives has no effect on
the orderedness,
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! FORVHGQHVVXQGHUUHYHUVLRQ meaning that reversing all preference pairs has no effect
on the orderedness,
! FORVHGQHVVXQGHUUHVWULFWLRQ meaning that parts of an ordering are ordered,
! FORVHGQHVVXQGHUFRQFDWHQDWLRQ meaning that ordering orderings in a linear way has
no effect on the orderedness, and finally
! FORVHGQHVV XQGHU VXEVWLWXWLRQ means that the size of an indifference class or
incomparability class in a relation has no effect on the orderedness.
All well-known sets of orderings satisfy these six criteria, but there are many other sets
which do so as well. For instance the set of tournaments and many of its subsets satisfy
these six conditions. So, although transitivity may give rise to a specific type of
orderings in that framework it is no longer the main ingredient. Furthermore, because
the last five conditions are based on operations, closure operations on sets can be
defined. By these the smallest set of orderings containing a given set of relations can
be determined. Therefore, a type of ordering can be regarded as an arrangement
(according to the operations) of some admitted atomic pieces of disorder. This is
stressed by the result that a minimal extension of a set of orderings is only acheaved
by adding one new atomic piece of disorder. In section 2 this is explained with more
details.
In section 3 by virtue of this system of ordering the aggregation of preference orderings
is studied in a broader view. Actually aggregation rules which are Pareto-optimal,
independent of irrelevant alternatives and neutral are studied. It appears that although
the range of these mechanisms is no longer imposed by transitivity conditions,
contamination with serious defects remains prominent. Let for instance both the set of
individual orderings and the range of the aggregation rule be subsets of the set of
tournaments. Then theorem 3.2 implies that the rule is either dictatorial or its range
consists of infinitely many more atomic pieces of disorder than the set of individual
orderings does. By Pareto-optimality this latter set is contained in that range. Therefore,
one could say that avoiding dictatorship implies a non-marginal admittance of new
atomic pieces of disorder, which of course makes the aggregated outcomes much more
complicated. In other well-known impossibility theorems, see e.g. Arrow [1963], Blair &
Pollack [1979], Blau [1979], Ferejohn & Grether [1974] and many others, the
aggregation rules are not imposed by neutrality. So, the new result presented here
suggests that there is a certain trated-off between neutrality and the transitivity of the
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orderings in the range. Moreover, in Storcken [1989] it is shown that under very mild
transitivity conditions for the orderings in the range, Pareto-optimality non-dictatorship
and independence of irrelevant alternatives imply neutrality.
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§ 2. ORDERINGS
The system, introduced hereafter, classifies sets of relations as sets of orderings. The
classification is done by six critiria for sets of relations. So, the system classifies W\SHV
of orderings. The type of ordering, e.g. linearity, weakness, seminess, intervalness or
quasiness, of a given relation is determined by the classified set of orderings which that
relation is an element of. To be clear a relation can have several types, e.g. a linear
ordering can also be a weak ordering.
Altough only finite sets of alternatives are taken into consideration, the classification
does not depend on the number of elements which should be ordered. Therefore to be
able to discuss relations on a domain with an arbitrary number of elements, an infinite
but countable set of possible alternatives is needed. Let U be this infinite countable set.
Now D := {X * X φ U, X  ι and X is infinite} is the set of all finite and non-empty
subsets of U. D is the set of all possible domains of the relations discussed hereafter.
Furthermore, R := {<R,A> * A 0 D and R φ A x A} is the set of possible relations coupled
with their domains. The explicit denotation of the domains is necessary because later
on operations are defined that change the domain of a relation. Instead of <R,A> also
R  is written. The last given set for the classification system is S  the set of allA U
permutations on U.
In the following definition several monadic and binary operators are introduced. Some
of these are well-known but denoted accordingly to denotations used here instead of
standard notations in literature.
DEFINITION 2.1 5HODWLRQ2SHUDWRUV
Let R , R'  be two relations in R. Let a 0 A and let Φ 0 S . Let D φ A such that D  ι.A B U
2.1.0 cR  := <{<x,y> * <x,y> ⌠ R }, A> is the FRPSOHPHQW of R .A A A
2.1.1 aR  := <{<x,y> 0 R  * <y,x> ⌠ R }, A> is the DV\PPHWULFSDUW of R .A A A A
2.1.2 sR  := <{<x,y> 0 R  * <y,x> 0 R }, A> is the V\PPHWULFSDUW of R .A A A A
2.1.3 vR  := <{<x,y> * <y,x> 0 R }, A> is the UHYHUVH of R .A A A
2.1.4 ΦR  = <{<Φ(x),Φ(y)> 0 Φ(A) x Φ(A) : <x,y> 0 R }, Φ(A)>, is the Φ SHUPXWDWLRQ of R .A A A
2.1.5 R *  := <{<x,y> 0 D x D * <x,y> 0 R }, D> is the UHVWULFWLRQ of R  to D.A D A A
2.1.6 Let A 1 B = ι. R  + R'  := <{<x,y> * <x,y> 0 R , <x,y> 0 R'  or <x,y> 0 A x B},A B A B
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A χ B> is the FRQFDWHQDWLRQ of R  ZLWK R' .A B
2.1.7 Let furthermore, A 1 B φ {a} and Z = (A - {a}) χ B. Sub(R ,a,R' ) := <{<x,y> *A B
<x,y> 0 R' , <x,y> 0 R * , x 0 B and <a,y> 0 R , or y 0 B and <x,a> 0 R }, Z>B A A-{a} A A
is the VXEVWLWXWLRQ of R'  RQ a LQ R .B A
In R  + R'  all the elements in A are strictly preferred to all the elements of B, where RA B A
+ R'  and R  are the same on A and R  + R'  is equal to R'  on B. So, (A x B)  φ a(RB A A B B A χ B A
+ R' ), (R  + R' )*  = R  and (R  + R' )*  = R' . In Sub(R ,a,R' )  R'  plays the rôle of a inB A B A A A B B B A B B
R .A
Next the definition of orderings is introduced.
DEFINITION 2.2 2UGHULQJV
Let V δ R a set of relations.
V is FODVVLILHGDVDVHWRIRUGHULQJV, iff
2.2.1 V is FORVHGXQGHUSHUPXWDWLRQ, i.e., ΦR  0 V, for all Φ 0 S  and all R  0 V,A U A
2.2.2 V is FORVHGXQGHUUHYHUVLRQ, i.e., vR  0 V, for all R  0 V,A A
2.2.3. V is FORVHGXQGHUUHVWULFWLRQ, i.e., R *  0 V, for all R  0 V and all ι  B φ A,A B A
2.2.4 V is FORVHGXQGHUFRQFDWHQDWLRQ, i.e., R  + R'  0 V, for all R ,R'  0 V with A 1 B =A B A B
ι,
2.2.5 V is QRQWULYLDO, i.e., for all X 0 D there are R ,R'  0 R such that R  0 V andX X X
R'  ⌠ V, and X
2.2.6 V is FORVHGXQGHUVXEVWLWXWLRQ, i.e., Sub(R ,a,R' ) 0 V, for all a 0 A and all R , R'A B A B
0 V, with vR'  = R'  and A 1 B φ {a}.B B
If V φ R is classified as set of orderings, then V is closed under 5 operations and non-
trivial. If V is closed under permutation, then V does not discreminate between the
names of the elements of U. The closedness under reversion implies that if R  is aA
special type or ordering, then the relation vR  where every element is ordered in aA
reversed way is also of that type. The closedness under restriction implies that parts of
a special type of ordering are also of that type. The closedness under concatenation
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implies that it is possible to order orderings of a special type in a linear way. The
closedness under substitution implies that reversible parts of a relation can be
substituted by reversible relations. The non-triviality implies that on every possible
domain X 0 D a classified set is a non-trivial set of relations. By this it is clear that the
six conditions 2.2.1 up to 2.2.6 are very natural.
In Swart & Storcken [1992] it is proved that all well-known sets of orderings, such as the
set of OLQHDU RUGHULQJV L := {R  0 R : R  is reflexive, complete, antisymmetric andX X
transitive}, are all classifiable as sets of orderings. But also new types of orderings are
found, e.g., for integers m,p > 0
T  := {R  0 R * R  is reflexive, antisymmetric and complete and there are am,p X X
partition X1,X2,...,Xk of X and relations R1 ,R2 ,...RkX1 X2 Xk
such that 
(1) R1  + R2  + ... + Rk  = R ,X1 X2 Xk X
(2) *Xi* # m for all i 0 {1,...,k},
(3) for all Ri  there are Li  0 L such that ∗(Ri ,Li ) # p}.Xi Xi Xi Xi
Here ∗ denotes the Kemeny distance between two relations ∗(R ,R' ) := ½*R  ) R' *.X X X X
See also Kemeny & Snell [1962]. Distance function ∗ on relations counts the preference
pairs which have to be reversed to obtain relations R  from R' . T  consists of thoseX X m,k
WRXUQDPHQWV in T := {R  0 R : R  is reflexive, complete and antisymmetric} in which thereX X
are no circuits of length greater than m and the circuits of length smaller or equal to m
are at most on distance k from L. In the classification system along with the well-known
sets of orderings an infinite number of new sets of orderings are found.
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Diagram of elements of T5,3
Having this classification system of orderings, it is possible to deduce several properties
about sets of orderings. Such that if V is classified as a set of orderings, then all
relations in V are reflexive or all relations in V are irreflexive. Or every classified set of
orderings V has a subset W which is RUGHULVRPRUSK to the set of linear orderings. So,
there is nothing "more ordered" than linearly. A well-known consequence of this
theorem is L φ W := {R  0 R, : R  is reflexive, complete and transitive}, where W is theX X
set of ZHDNRUGHULQJV.
It is obvious that L  W. So, L δ W. A question is now whether or not there is a set V
φ R which is a classified set of orderings such that L δ V δ W? Or formulated otherwise:
Is W a minimal extension of L? Because this notion of minimal extension is important
later on in this paper it is introduced more precise.
DEFINITION 2.3 0LQLPDO([WHQVLRQ
Let V,W φ R be two sets of orderings.
W is a PLQLPDOH[WHQVLRQ of V, iff V δ W and for all classified sets of orderings X not
V δ X δ W. Notation V δ  W.m
Now the greater a classified set of orderings is, the more atomic pieces of disorder in
an ordering are admitted, the less structured the orderings in that set can be. So, a
minimal extension, V δ  W, is a minimal loss of structure in ordering elements.m
In order to discuss the impossibility theorems developed in the following section it is
necessary to characterize this notion of minimal extension. Therefore some closuring
operations are defined.
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DEFINITION 2.4 &ORVXUH
Let V φ R be a set of relations.
2.4.1 Ε (V) is WKHFORVXUHXQGHUSHUPXWDWLRQ of V, i.e.1
Ε (V) := 1 {W φ R : V φ W and W is closed under permutation}.1
2.4.2 Ε (V) is WKHFORVXUHXQGHUUHYHUVLRQ of V, i.e.2
Ε (V) := 1 {W φ R : V φ W and W is closed under reversion}.2
2.4.3 Ε (V) is the FORVXUHXQGHUUHVWULFWLRQ of V, i.e.3
Ε (V) := 1 {W φ R : V φ W and W is closed under restriction}.3
2.4.4 Ε (V) is WKHFORVXUHXQGHUFRQFDWHQDWLRQ of V, i.e.4
Ε (V) := 1 {W φ R : V φ W and W is closed under concatenation}.4
2.4.5 Ε (V) is WKHFORVXUHXQGHUVXEVWLWXWLRQ of V, i.e.5
Ε (V) := 1 {W φ R : V φ W and W is closed under substitution}.5
A closure operation assigns to an arbitrary set V φ R a set W φ R which is closed under
a specific operation and contains V, such that W is the "smallest" set satisfying those
two conditions. If for instance V can be classified as a set of orderings, then Ε (V) = Vi
for all i 0 {1,2,3,4,5}.
The following theorem characterizes minimal extensions.
THEOREM 2.5 &KDUDFWHURIPLQLPDOH[WHQVLRQV
Let V and W be two classified sets of orderings. Then (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) are equivalent.
2.5.1 V δ  W.m
2.5.2 There exists a relation R  0 W - V, such thatX
2.5.2.1 R *  0 V for all ι  Y δ XX Y
2.5.2.2 Μ(V) := Ε Ε Ε Ε Ε (V χ {R }) = Ε Ε (V χ {R , vR }) = W.4 5 3 2 1 X 4 5 X X
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.5
See Swart & Storcken [1992].
Theorem 2.5 characterizes minimal extensions: V δ  W iff there is a relation R  0 W - V,m X
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such that the "smallest" classifiable set of orderings which contains V χ {R } is equal toX
W. So, W is obtained by adding one new type of (dis)order, R , to V. Therefore, everyX
relation R  0 W can be constructed, i.e., by permutation, reversion, restriction,A
concatenation or substitution, from the relations in V and one additional relation R .X
Suppose W  δ  W  δ  W  δ  ... δ  W  for classifiable sets of orderings W ,W ,..... W .0 m 1 m 2 m m k 0 1 k
Then by theorem 2.5 there are R1 , R2 ,..., Rk  such that Ri  0 W  - W  and W  =X1 X2 Xk Xi i i-1 i
Μ(W  χ {Ri }). So, every relation R  0 W  can be constructed from the relations in Wi-1 Xi A k 0
and a finite number of additional relations. Or stated otherwise only a finite number of
new types of (dis)order has to be added to W  in order to obtain W . This notion is0 k
important in the following section.
The following lemmas 2.6 and 2.7 are used in section 3. A relation R  0 T is UHGXFLEOHX
iff there exists a non-trivial subset A of X such that R  = R *  + R * . Let C :=X X A X X-A
{R  0 R * R  is reflexive and complete} be the set of VWURQJO\FRPSOHWH relations. It canX X
be classified as a set of orderings. For all R  0 C an equivalence relation E(R ) on X isX X
defined for all a,b 0 X as follows. The pair <a,b> is in E(R ) if for all x 0 X  [<a,x> 0 RX X
] <b,x> 0 R  and <x,a> 0 R  ] <x,b> 0 R ]. So, <a,b> 0 E(R ) iff they are related to allX X X X
elements in X similarly. A relation R  0 C FDQQRW EH FRQGHQVDWHG iff all equivalenceX
classes of E(R ) are singletons. Note that if R  cannot be condensated, then there areX X
no relations R ,R'  0 C and elements a 0 A such that vR'  = R , *B* ∃ 2, A 1 B = ι andA B B B
R  = Sub(R ,a,R' ).X A B
LEMMA 2.6
Let V,W φ C be classified sets of orderings such that V δ  W. Let R  0 W be irreduciblem X
and suppose it cannot be condensated. Then for all ι  Y δ X : R *  0 V.X Y
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.6
Let R  0 W - V be irreducible and suppose it cannot be condensated. Take ι  Y δ X.X
Now by theorem 2.5 R  0 W = Ε Ε Ε Ε Ε (V χ {R' }) for some R'  0 W - V such that for allX 4 5 3 2 1 A A
ι  B δ A: R'*  0 V. Because R  is irreducible R  0 Ε Ε Ε Ε (V χ {R'}). Because RA B X X 5 3 2 1 A X
cannot be condensated R  0 Ε Ε Ε (V χ {R'}) = V χ Ε Ε Ε ({R'}). But now it followsX 3 2 1 A 3 2 1 A
evidently that R *  0 V.X Y
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Because all tournaments cannot be condensated it follows:
LEMMA 2.7
Let V,W φ T be classified sets of orderings such that V δ  W. Let R  0 W be irreducible.m X
Then for all ι  Y δ X : R *  0 V.X Y
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§ 3. AN IMPOSSIBILITY IN AGGREGATING INTRANSITIVE PREFERENCES
In this section it will be proved that there is no "nice" aggregation rule, F, from a set of
classified profiles V  (of a set of individuals N over a classified set of orderings V φ T)n
to the set of tournaments T, such that there exist classified sets of orderings V = W ,0
W ,..., W  φ T for any finite k with W  δ  W  δ  W ... ... δ  W  and F(V ) φ W  φ T. So,1 k 0 m 1 m 2 m k kn
in order to have a "nice" aggregation rule F it is necessary to admit infinitely many new
types of (dis)order in the range of F. In that case compared to V the range of F is very
much less structured.
First we define the notion used above and then we deduce this impossibility result.
Throughout this section let V δ T be a classified set of orderings and let N := {1,2,...,n}
a set of n (∃ 1) individuals  V  := {Β  : Β  = <R1 , R2 ,...,Rn > for some R1 ,R2 ,...,Rnn A A A A A A A A
0 V} is the set of profiles of N over V. If Β  0 V  and i 0 N, then Β (i) is the i  componentA An th
of Β , hence Ri  = Β (i). It is the relation of individual i at profile Β .A A A A
Now let W φ R be a classified set of orderings and throughout this section let F be a
function from V  to W. F is called a ZHOIDUHIXQFWLRQ or DJJUHJDWLRQUXOH. Suppose furthern
throughout this section, that F has the following 3 properties:
  (1) F is 3DUHWRRSWLPDO, i.e. F(<R ,R ,...,R >) = R , for all R  0 V,A A A A A
  (2) F is QHXWUDO, i.e. F(ΦΒ ) = ΦF(Β ), for all Β  0 V  and Φ 0 S , where ΦΒ (i) =A A A U An
<ΦΒ (1), ΦΒ (2),...,ΦΒ (n)>,A A A
  (3) F is LQGHSHQGHQWRILUUHOHYDQWDOWHUQDWLYHV, i.e. for all Β ,Β' 0 V  and all ι  B φA A n
A: if Β *  = Β'* , then F(Β )*  = F(Β')* , where Β *  = <Β (1)* , Β (2)* ,...,A B A B A B A B A B A B A B
Β (n)* >.A B
These three properties are well-known in Social Choice Theory, see e.g., Sen [1986]
or Kelly [1978]. It is straightforward to prove that:
LEMMA 3.1
If F(V ) δ T or V = L, then F(V ) can be classified as a set of orderings.n n
See also Storcken [1989]. The following theorem formalizes the impossibility result
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indicated above.
THEOREM 3.2
Let k be an arbitrary number such that V = W ,W ,...,W  φ T are classified sets of0 1 k
orderings. Furthermore, suppose W  δ  W  δ  ... δ  W  = F(V ) and V  T. Then F is0 m 1 m m k n
GLFWDWRULDO, i.e., there is an individual i 0 N such that for all Β  0 V  : Β (i) 1 avF(Β ) =A A An
ι.
Theorem 3.2 implies that several "nice" conditions for welfare functions together imply
dictatorship. In this sence theorem 3.2 can be interpreted as an other impossibility
theorem. The novelty of theorem 3.2 is that the conditions on the range and domain of
the welfare function are not in terms of transitivity or acyclicity. By virtue of the
classification system of orderings it is possible to determine orderings without making
use of transitivity conditions. Furthermore, it is possible to compare sets of orderings
in terms of constructions. As we have formulated in §2 the domain-range condition
imposes that elements in the range can be constructed from the elements of the
domain and a finite number of additional types of (dis)order. The other conditions are
often explicitly (Pareto-optimality and the independence of irrelevant alternatives) or
implicitly (neutrality) imposed on welfare function. So, to resolve the traditional
impossibility it is necessary to admit a range which contains infinitely many types of
(dis)order which are not in the domain. In that case the domain, compared to the range,
is much more structured.
To prove theorem 3.2 we assume (3.3) and deduce a contradiction by several lemma's.
ASSUMPTION 3.3
Let k be a number such that V = W ,..., F(V ) = W  φ T be classified sets of orderings0 kn
V  T and W  δ  W  δ  W  δ  ... δ  W . Furthermore, let F be QRQGLFWDWRULDO, i.e., for all0 m 1 m 2 m m k
i 0 N there is a profile Β  0 V  such that Β (i) 1 avF(Β )  ι.A A An
The following lemma states that if a specific sequence of sets of orderings is in the
range of F, then this sequence is also in the domain.
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LEMMA 3.4 (Assume 3.3).
Let p be a non-negative integer. If for all m 0 {0,1,2,..} T  φ F(V ), then for all m 0m,p n
{0,1,2,..} T  φ V.m,p
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.4
Let T  φ F(V ) for all m 0 {0,1,2,...}. Take R  0 T . It is sufficient to prove that R  0 V.m,p X t,p Xn
Without loss of generality suppose R  is irreducible and *X* = t. Then there exists aX
Hamilton circuit <y ,y ,...,y ,y > along R , i.e., {y ,y ,...,y } = X, *X* = t and1 2 t 1 X 1 2 t
<y ,y >,<y ,y >...,<y ,y > 0 aR .1 2 2 3 t 1 X
y .)))>)).y3 4
   y2
y .)))<)).y1 t
Because R  0 T , there is a relation R  0 L such that ∗(R , R ) # p. Without loss ofX t,p X X X1 1
generality suppose <y ,y > 0 R . Take Y := X χ A, where X 1 A = {y }, *A* = k and1 2 X 11
A = {y ,a ,a ,...,a }. Now we contruct R  0 L and R  0 T  such that ∗(R ,R ) # p. Take1 1 2 k Y Y t+k,p Y Y2 3 3 2
R  := Sub(R ,y ,R ), where y a a a ...a  : R  (R  ranks y  best a  second best and so on).2 1 4 4 4Y X 1 A 1 1 2 3 k A A 1 1
Take R  0 T such that for all c,d 0 Y:3Y
<c,d> 0 R  iff <c,d> 0 R , or <c,d> 0 R  , or3 4Y X  A
<c,d> = <a ,y>, a  0 A, y  0 X ! {y } and <y ,y>0 R , ori j i j 1 1 j Y2
<c,d> = <y ,a>, a  0 A, y  0 X  ! {y } and <y ,y > 0 R .j i i j 1 j 1 Y2
Now R *  = R . Because R  and R  only differ on X it follows that ∗(R ,R ) = ∗(R * ,R * )3 3 2 3 2 3 2Y X X Y Y Y Y Y X Y X
= ∗(R ,R ) # p. Hence R  0 T  φ F(V ). Because V δ  W  δ  ... δ  W  δ  F(V ) itX X Y t+k,p m 1 m m k-1 m1 3 n n
follows by repeated application of lemma 2.7 that R *  0 V. Hence, R  0 V.3Y X X
The following result is on decisiveness. Let S φ N. Then S is said to be TXDVLGHFLVLYH if
for all x,y 0 U, x  y, and all profiles ΒA
<x,y> 0 Β (i) for all i 0 S and <y,x> 0 Β (j) for all j 0 N ! S implies <x,y> 0 aF(Β ).A A A
LEMMA 3.5
Assume (3.3). There are S,T,M φ N such that S 1 T 1 M = ι, all three are quasi-decisive
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and one of the following three (a), (b) or (c) holds. Where,
(a) S χ T = S χ M = T χ M = N;
(b) S 1 T = S 1 M = T 1 M = ι and S χ T χ M = N;
(c) S χ T δ M, S 1 T = ι and S χ T is quasi decisive.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.5
Let B be the set of quasi-decisive coalitions. Since F is non-dictatorial it follows that for
all i 0 N there is a coalition X 0 B such that i ⌠ X. Hence, 1{X * X 0 B} = ι. So, there arei i
X,Y 0 B such that X 1 Y ⌠ B. Obviously it follows that Z = N ! (X 1 Y) 0 B. If
N ! (X 1 Z) 0 B, then take S = X, M = Z and T = N ! (X 1 Z) and we are done by (a). So,
X 1 Z 0 B. Similarly we are done if N ! (Y 1 Z) 0 B. So, Y 1 Z 0 B.
Take S = X 1 Z and T = Y 1 Z. So, X 1 Y = ι. If S χ T 0 B, then M = N 0 B because of
Pareto-optimality and we are done by (c). So, M = N ! (S χ T) 0 B which yields case (b).
The following lemma is in some sense the reverse of lemma 3.4. If the sequence of sets
of orderings T  for m ∃ 1 is in the domain of F then the sequence of sets of orderingsm,p
T  for m ∃ 1 is in the range of F.m,p + 1
LEMMA 3.6
Assume (3.3). Let p be a non-negative integer.
If for all m 0 {0,1,2,...} T  φ V, then for all m 0 {0,1,2,...} T  φ F(V )m,p m,p+1 n
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.6
Take t,p 0 {0,1,2,...} and suppose T  φ V for all m 0 {0,1,2,...}.m,p
Let R  0 T . It is sufficient to prove that R  0 F(V ).X t,p+1 X n
Without loss of generality suppose R  is irreducible and R  0 T  - T .X X t,p+1 t,p
Then there is a R  0 L such that ∗(R ,R ) = p + 1 ∃ 1. Hence, there are x,y 0 X such that1 1X X X
<x,y> 0 R  and <y,x> 0 R .X X1
Hence, ∗(R * ,R * ) # p and R *  0 T  φ V. Now we construct a profile Β  0 VX X-{x} X X-{x} X X-{x} t,p X1 n
such that F(Β ) = R .X X
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By lemma 3.5 there are quasi-decisive S, T, M such that S 1 T 1 M = ι. Let X  := {b 01
X - {x} * <b,x> 0 R } and X  := {b 0 X - {x} * <x,b> 0 R }.  Since R  is irreducible X   ιX 2 X X 1
and X   ι. Therefore2
R *X X X X ! {x} X t,p X X X X ! {x} X t,p {x}1 = (R * )* 1 0 T  and R * 2 = (R * )* 2 0 T . Denote Id  = <{x} × {x}, {x}>.
In view of lemma 3.5 we may distinguish three cases.
Case 1 S 1 T = S 1 M = T 1 M = N
Take Β  0 V  such that:X n
Β (i) = (R *X X X {x} X X1) + Id  + R * 2 for all i 0 S 1 T,
Β (i) = Id  + (R * ) for all i 0 T 1 M, andX {x} X X-{x}
Β (i) = (R * ) + Id for all i 0 S 1 M.X X X-{x} {x}
Now since S, M, T, N 0 B it follows straightforwardly that F(Β ) = R .X X
Case 2 S χ T δ M, S 1 T = ι and S χ T 0 B.
Take Β  0 V  such that:X n
Β (i) = (R ) + Id for i 0 S,X X ! {x} {x}
Β (i) = Id  + (R ) for i 0 T, andX {x} X-{x}
Β (i) = R *X X X {x} X X2 + Id  + R * 1 for all i 0 N ! (S χ T).
Now since S, T, S χ T, N 0 B it follows straightforwardly that F(Β ) = R .X X
Case 3 S 1 T = S 1 M = T 1 M = ι and S χ T χ M = N.
We distinguish two subcases.
Subcase 1 p = 0.
By baR  denote (R  ! {<a,b>}) χ {<b,a>}.X X
So, R  = xyR , and Id  + R  + Id  = R .X X {y} X*X ! {x,y} {x} X1 1 1
Take Β  such thatX
Id  + Id  + R  = Β (i) for i 0 S,{y} {x} X*X ! {x,y} X1
R  + Id  + Id  = Β (i) for i 0 T, and1X*X ! {x,y} {y} {x} X
Id  + R  + Id  = Β (i) for i 0 M.{x} X*X ! {x,y} {y} X1
Now by S, T, M, N 0 B it follows that F(Β ) = R .X X
Subcase 2 p ∃ 1.
Then there are a,b, with {a,b}  {x,y} such that <a,b> 0 R  and <b,a> 0 R . Hence,X X 1
— 17 —
∗(baR ,R ) # p and baR  0 T . But then ∗(ab(vR ),vR ) # p and ∗(xy(vR ),vR ) # p.X X X t,p X X X X1 1 1
Furthermore, ∗(ba(yxR ),R ) < p. So, ba(yxR ) 0 T .X X X t,p1
Now consider Β  such thatX
ab(vR ) = Β (i) for i 0 SX X
xy(vR ) = Β (i) for i 0 TY X
ba(yxR ) = Β (i) for i 0 MX X
Now by S,T,M 0 B it follows that F(Β ) = R .x x
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
Assume (3.3). We will deduce a contradiction.
Note that T  = L for all m , {0,1,2,....}. So, by a simple induction on p and applyingm,0
lemma 3.4 and lemma 3.6 it follows that T  φ V for all m,p 0 {0,1,2,..}. Hence, T φm,p
U{T  : m,p 0 {0,1,2,..}} φ V. This contradicts V δ T which is assumed in (3.3).m,p
Hence, F is dictatorial.
An interpretation of this theorem has been discussed earlier. Let us reconsider this
theorem theoretically here. Although no transitivity or acyclicity condition is imposed on
the domain and the range of the welfare functions in theorem 3.2, both are imposed by
other conditions. It is assumed that the range and the domain are in T. So the relations
in the range and the domain are complete, antisymmetric and reflexive. Especially for
the range these conditions are restrictive, because they enforce a strict preference
between all the alternatives. So, neither indifferences nor incomparabilities are possible
under these restrictions.
Whether there exist stronger impossibility results, like theorem 3.2, in which the
completeness and/or the antisymmetry is dropped is still an open question. The next
and final theorem might invite the reader to deduce such stronger results.
THEOREM 3.7
Let k be an arbitrary number such that V = L = W , W , W ,...,W  φ R are classified sets0 1 2 k
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of orderings. 
Furthermore, suppose W  δ  W  δ  ... δ  W  δ  F(V ).0 m 1 m m k-1 m n
Then F is dictatorial.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.7
Suppose F is non-dictatorial and such a k exists. Define H : L 6 C for all Β  0 L asA
follows H(Β ) := cavF(Β ). In H(Β ) all incomparabilities of F(Β ) have becomeA A A A
indifferences. Because F is non-dictatorial H is non-dictatorial. Furthermore, it follows
that H is neutral, independent of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto-optimal. Denote
W  := {cavR  : R  0 W}.cav X X
Note that Μ(W χ {R })  = Μ(W  χ {cavR }). So, W  := W  or W  δ  W , where jX X j i j m icav cav cav cav cav cav
= i - 1.
Hence, there is a number p such that V = L = C , C ,...C  φ C are classified sets of0 1 p
orderings and C  δ  C  δ  ... δ  C  δ  H(V ).o m 1 m m p-1 m n
Now there are two cases.
Case 1 There is a relation R  0 C  - T which is irreducible and which cannot beX p
condensated.
Because R  is irreducible and cannot be condensated there are x ,x ,x ,...,x  0 X suchX 1 2 3 m
that *X* = m, <x ,x > 0 aR  and1 2 X
<x ,x >,<x ,x >,...,<x ,x >,<x ,x > 0 R . Because R  0 C  = H(V ), there is a profile Β2 3 3 4 m-1 m m 1 X X p Xn
0 L  such that H(Β ) = R .n X X
Now take A = {a ,a ,...,a ,x } and *A* = p+1 and A 1 X = {x }.1 2 p 1 1
Let x a a ...a  : R  0 L.1 1 2 p A1
Take Β  0 L  such that for i 0 N Β (i) := Sub(Β (i),x ,R ).2 n 2 1Z Z X 1 A
Then by using neutrality and Pareto-optimality H(Β ) = Sub(R ,x ,R ) =: R .2 1 3Z X 1 A Z
R  is irreducible because <x ,a >,<a ,a >,...<a ,a > 0 aR  and3 3Z 1 1 1 2 p-1 p Z
<a ,x >,<x ,x >,<x ,x >,...,<x ,x > 0 R .p 2 2 3 3 4 m 1 Z3
R  cannot be condensated because the elements in Z-X play different rôles.3Z
Now applying theorem 2.6 p times it follows that
R  = R *  0 W  = V = L φ T.X Z X 03
This, however, cannot be the case.
Case 2 All irreducible relations R  in C  which cannot be condensated are in T.X p
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Hence, for all R  0 C  there are equivalence classes B ,B ,..,B  of E(R ) such thatA p 1 2 t A
B ,B ,..,B  is a partition of A. And, furthermore, if B = {b ,...,b } such that b  0 B , b  01 2 t 1 t 1 1 2
B ,..., b  0 B , then R *  0 T 1 C .2 t t A B p
Now we define G : L  6 T for all Β  0 L  as  followsn nX
G(Β ) := aH(Β ) χ (sH(Β ) 1 Β (1)).X X X X
It is straightforward to prove that G is neutral, independent of irrelevant alternatives,
Pareto-optimal and non-dictatorial.
By theorem 3.2 it is sufficient to prove that G(L ) φ C .n p
Take R  0 G(L ). Then there are R'  0 C  and profile Β' 0 L  such that H(Β') = R' andA A p A A An n
G(Β' ) = R  = aR' χ (sR' 1 Β'(1)). Let B ,B ,...,B  be the equivalence classes of E(R').A A A A A 1 2 t A
Take B = {b ,b ,...,b } such that b  0 B , b  0 B ,.... b  0 B . Then H(Β'* ) = R'*  0 C . Now1 2 t 1 1 2 2 t t A B A B p
let Β0A A B0:= Β'*  and 
Βm m-1A A m A Bm(i) := Sub(Β m-1(i), b , Β'(i)* m) for all i 0 N and all m 0 {1,2,...,t}.
Then by the Pareto-optimality and the neutrality G(Β')*A A A Am = G(Βmm) = H(Βmm) for all m 0
{0,1,...,t}.
Hence R  = G(Β')*A A A pt 0 C .
Note that the theorem above holds for all classifiable sets of relations V φ T, such that
for all R  0 L and all R  0 V and all y 0 Y such that X 1 Y φ {y} : Sub(R ,y,R ) 0 V. So,X Y Y X
V is substitutionally closed over the set of linear orderings. So the question whether
there exist stronger results than theorem 3.2 becomes interesting because by the partial
result theorem 3.7 their abcense cannot be proven generally.
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